I Introduction
In this paper, we derive a comparative-static result for interior Cournot equilibria. We then show its relevance to various literatures where rms take actions to reduce their marginal costs prior to competing in the nal stage of a two-stage game.
Our comparative-static result pertains to situations where rms have constant marginal costs.
If the vector of marginal costs is changed exogenously without altering the sum of its components, Bergstrom and Varian 1985 establish that industry output does not change provided all rms continue to produce i.e. the equilibrium is interior". Since industry output is the same, industry revenue and gross consumer surplus are una ected. Hence, any induced change in aggregate production costs will alter both industry pro t and social surplus in the opposite direction.
Our result provides a simple criterion to determine, for any redistribution across the rms of the unchanged marginal-cost sum, whether industry pro t and social surplus increase. An important implication of our result is that|among all con gurations with the same marginal-cost sum|the vector with equal marginal costs minimizes industry pro t and social surplus. This has important implications for two-stage games.
Since the early 1980's, economists have explored the subtle consequences of strategic interaction in a broad range of applications by i n v estigating models where rms play a Cournot game after simultaneously taking actions in the rst stage which determine second-stage marginal costs. Two simplifying assumptions have been particularly popular: 1 rms are initially identical and 2 their marginal costs in the second stage are constant rather than upward-sloping functions of secondstage output. These assumptions have been thought su cient to justify restricting attention to symmetric outcomes. Given our comparative-static result, however, there is a presumption that nonidentical actions by identical agents in the rst stage are required to maximize social surplus and industry pro t. We s a y presumption" because it is possible that the additional cost of any departure from identical actions in the rst stage will outweigh the net bene t induced in the second stage. However, we derive a condition su cient to rule out this possibility and verify that the condition holds for a wide range of parameter values in each of the models we review. The applications that we consider arise in the literatures on learning-by-doing, research joint v entures, cost-reducing R&D, and pollution control.
In their analysis of the private and social e ects of learning-by-doing, Spence 1981 , Fudenberg and Tirole 1983 , Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1988 , Agliardi 1990 , Krouse 1994 , and many others have examined two-stage games where Cournot competitors produce a homogeneous good in each of two periods. Each rm is typically assumed to have the same marginal cost in the rst stage and the same ability to reduce second-stage marginal costs by learning from the experience of rst-stage production. 1 Nevertheless, our analysis suggests that asymmetric rst-stage production, leading to market dominance by a few, often maximizes social surplus. In such situations, optimal government i n tervention would call for unequal treatment of identical rms. Similar observations apply to the earlier literature on oligopolistic extraction in circumstances where extraction today raises the marginal cost of extraction tomorrow|the mirror image of learning-by-doing. 1 Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1988 and Agliardi 1990 start with an asymmetric situation| rms di er either in initial starting costs or have di erential rates of learning.
A substantial literature initiated by d' Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988 , and extended by Kamien, Muller, and Zang 1992, Suzumura 1992 , and many others asks how a cartel research joint v enture should arrange its members' investments in R&D if it seeks to maximize joint pro ts but is compelled by l a w to relinquish control before the production stage. 2 These authors adopt a two-stage structure with cooperative i n v estment in the rst stage and Cournot competition in the second. As Salant and Sha er 1996 point out in the context of the d'Aspremont-Jacquemin model, however, the cartel should sometimes choose asymmetric investments rather than the symmetric investments to which the entire literature has con ned attention. Besley and Suzumura 1992 have also considered two-stage games where ex ante identical Cournot competitors produce homogeneous goods in stage two after investing simultaneously in cost-reducing R&D in stage one. However, in their formulations, the rms have no opportunity to form a research joint v enture. Government subsidization of research may be called for in such cases either to correct a divergence between private and social bene ts of R&D Spence, 1984 or to induce more favorable outcomes in international rivalry Spencer and Brander, 1983 . Building on these earlier models, Bagwell and Staiger 1994 and Leahy and Neary 1996 have recently calculated the socially optimal subsidy if government i n tervention is con ned to the research stage. Their calculations assume symmetric subsidies, however, and thus overlook the possibility that o ering unequal subsidies to identical rms may sometimes be optimal. In the case of international rivalry with multiple competing domestic rms, for instance, the home government m a y wish to play f a v orites and create a dominant exporting rm. 3 In Fischer 1996, identical rms with access to the same set of technologies simultaneously and independently choose which technology to install in the rst stage and then use the chosen technologies in a second-stage Cournot game. A cleaner technology is assumed to be more costly to install but to reduce the emissions per unit output next period and, therefore, to lower the pollution tax per unit output. As long as environmental damage is increasing in aggregate emissions, our 2 As explained in Salant and Sha er 1996, this objective function may be appropriate even if sidepayments are prohibitively costly.
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This observation has also been noted by Collie 1993 . In his model, however, the domestic rms di er ex-ante. Collie points out that o ering the same export subsidy to all rms, even to those which are less e cient, may reduce welfare. Our additional insight is that equal treatment of all rms may reduce welfare even if the rms are identical.
analysis suggests that asymmetric technology choices sometimes maximize social surplus.
Newbery's 1990 analysis of the European experience with acid rain control contains a onepage appendix with the following model. The government dictates in the rst stage the maximum pollution it will permit each rm. A rm wishing to double its output while complying with the government standard must double its expenditures on abatement. Thus, the marginal abatement cost associated with increased production in the second stage is constant given the government standard. On the other hand, the larger the government standard, the less abatement equipment is needed to produce a given output while being in compliance; so the second-stage marginal cost of production is decreasing in the government's pollution standard. Newbery assumed that total emissions are constrained exogenously and investigated whether the government should set symmetric or asymmetric standards in order to maximize social surplus excluding damage assessments or, alternatively, to maximize industry pro ts. Newbery found that despite the symmetry of the problem, joint pro ts are maximized in his example by holding the identical rms to di erent emission standards. 4 However, in the example he reports, maximization of social surplus still requires symmetric treatment of the two rms. We replace his total emissions constraint with a symmetric damage function and show in his example that maximization of social surplus sometimes requires di erent pollution standards for the identical rms.
In order to lay the groundwork for these conclusions, we present our comparative-static result in section II. Then, in section III, we use it to derive a su cient condition for asymmetric actions to be socially and or privately optimal in the rst stage of a game played by ex-ante identical players.
In section IV, we apply our su cient condition to several of the prominent t w o-stage games in the 4 To our knowledge, Newbery was the rst to recognize the asymmetry phenomenon although he did not analyze it. Our other research in this area is reported in Salant and Sha er 1996 and Salant and Sha er 1997. The former article focuses on the R&D literature which follows d'Aspremont and Jacquemin. It discusses the appropriateness of the assumption of maximization of joint pro ts when a cartel cannot make sidepayments and shows that certain conclusions in the R&D literature no longer follow once optimal R&D investments are recognized to be asymmetric. The latter paper extends the comparative-static results reported here to circumstances where marginal costs are no longer constant or linear functions. This requires the application to the vector of endogenous marginal costs the concepts of Lorenz domination and stochastic dominance which h a v e proved so useful in the income inequality and uncertainty literatures. Long and Soubeyran 1995, in a paper extending the results in our earliest working paper on asymmetry, explain why asymmetric investments maximize the joint pro ts of an R&D cartel. While they neither discuss the implications of the result for maximization of social welfare nor trace its implications for non-R&D models, they do report a number of interesting results|among them that, in the case of linear demand, asymmetric cost reduction becomes more likely, the larger the number of participating rms." literature mentioned above. Section V concludes the paper.
II A Comparative-Static Result
Suppose n 2 rms with constant marginal costs play a Cournot game. Denote rm i's marginal cost as c i 0 and the inverse demand as P = PQ, where P is the market price and Q = P n i=1 q i is industry output. Assume PQ i s t wice continuously di erentiable, with P 0 0, 8Q 0 satisfying PQ 0. Firm i's pro t is i = PQq i , c i q i . Assume rm i's marginal revenue is everywhere weakly decreasing in each rival's output: P 0 + P 00 q i 0, 8q i Q. These assumptions ensure the existence of a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in output see Gaudet and Salant, 1991. Assume the Nash equilibrium is interior in the sense that each rm produces a strictly positive output q i 0 for i = 1 ; : : : ; n . Equilibrium quantities are then determined by the n rst-order conditions: PQ + P 0 Q q i , c i = 0 . An immediate implication is that a rm with a strictly higher marginal cost will have a strictly lower equilibrium output and two rms with the same marginal cost will have the same equilibrium output. Summing the n rst-order conditions to obtain nPQ+QP 0 Q, P n i=1 c i = 0 yields a second implication: aggregate output in any i n terior Cournot equilibrium depends only on the sum of the constant marginal costs and not on the distribution of those costs. We refer to this as the Bergstrom-Varian 1985 result. It follows that if marginal costs change but their sum remains constant, aggregate output will be unchanged assuming an interior equilibrium. Moreover, output will contract at each rm experiencing a marginal-cost increase and expand at each rm experiencing a marginal-cost decrease; there will be no change in the output of a rm with unchanged marginal cost. These well-known characteristics of Cournot equilibrium turn out to have a striking comparative-static implication.
Proposition: Suppose the marginal costs of the n rms in an industry are rearranged in a way which 1 preserves their sum and 2 results in a new Nash equilibrium which is also interior.
Then, industry pro t and social surplus are strictly higher after the rearrangement if and only if the variance of the marginal costs or, equivalently, the sum of their squares strictly increases.
Proof: The two h ypotheses ensure that the Bergstrom-Varian result holds. Therefore, indus-try output does not change. Moreover, industry revenue QPQ and gross consumer surplus R Q u=0 Pudu do not change since each is a function of the unchanged industry output. Since industry pro t is de ned as industry revenue net of production costs, and social surplus is de ned as gross consumer surplus net of production costs, an increase in industry pro t and social surplus will occur if and only if aggregate production costs decrease. We n o w show that aggregate production costs decrease if and only if the variance of the marginal costs increases.
Denote the initial marginal cost vector as c I = c I 1 ; : : : ; c I n 2R n + , the induced industry output as Q , and the equilibrium market price as P . Then rm i's equilibrium production is initially q I i = P , c I i = , P 0 Q . Denote the nal marginal cost vector as c F = c F 1 ; : : : ; c F n 2R n + . Since P n i=1 c I i = P n i=1 c F i , the market price, industry output, and slope of the inverse demand do not change. Hence, rm i's nal equilibrium production is q F i = P , c F i = , P 0 Q . Multiplying q I i by c I i and q F i by c F i and then summing each product over all n rms yields
Since the rst term inside the parenthesis in each summation is the same, the change in production costs due to the rearrangement of marginal costs simpli es to:
Thus, if the sum of the squared marginal costs strictly increases, industry production costs must decline.
We can re-express this conclusion in terms of changes in the variance of the marginal cost vector. Let n c = P n i=1 c I i = P n i=1 c F i . Then the right-hand side of equation 2 can be rewritten as a function of the sum of squared deviations from the mean as follows:
The rst and second terms inside the parentheses on the right-hand side are the variance of c I and c F respectively. Since n=,P 0 is positive, industry production costs decrease if and only if the variance of the industry's marginal cost vector increases. Since industry revenue and net consumer surplus remain constant, we conclude that industry pro t and social surplus strictly increase if and only if the variance of marginal costs increases.
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This comparative-static result permits a complete ordering in terms of industry pro t and social surplus of all marginal cost vectors with the same component sum provided they induce an interior Cournot equilibrium. In addition, since a positive relationship exists between the Her ndahl index and social surplus when industry output remains xed Farrell and Shapiro, 1990 , the Her ndahl index|the sum of the squared market shares|also strictly increases with the variance of marginal costs. Thus, the more`spread out' is the distribution of marginal costs, as measured by the variance, the greater will be industry pro t, social surplus, and the Her ndahl index. Surprisingly, this result depends on neither the functional form of demand nor on its curvature. 5
If all rms initially have the same marginal cost, the variance is zero. Given our Proposition, any rearrangement of marginal costs must, therefore, increase industry pro t and social surplus.
This gives rise to the following Corollary:
Corollary: Suppose all rms initially have the same marginal cost. Industry pro t and social surplus are then strictly smaller than they would be under any other con guration of marginal costs with the same sum provided the induced equilibrium is interior.
This Corollary is central to the results in the next section. To gain further insight i n to it, we provide an alternate proof and discuss the intuition. Assume initially that all rms have the same marginal cost c and, therefore, produce the same out put q. Let c i denote the change in rm i's marginal cost and q i denote the induced change in rm i's equilibrium output. Then the change in aggregate production costs when moving from a vector of equal components to one of unequal components but the same sum is
The rst term on the right equals the change in production costs which w ould occur if there were no output response to the exogenous change in the marginal cost vector. Since the induced changes 5
The concluding section discusses generalizations of these results to the case where marginal costs increase linearly with a common slope and a rm-speci c intercept. Most of the results generalize to convex marginal costs as well but a di erent approach is required. We discuss this generalization in Salant and Sha er 1997. in marginal costs sum to zero, no change in industry costs would occur if each rm continued to produce the common initial output of q. T h us, q P n i=1 c i = 0. The second term on the right equals the change in production costs which w ould occur once each rm's output re-equilibrated. Since output must decrease resp. increase at each rm whose marginal cost increases resp. decreases, a portion of what was produced by rms experiencing an increase in marginal costs is now produced instead by rms experiencing a reduction in marginal costs. As a result, the second term must be strictly negative. 6 Aggregate production costs decrease when the vector of marginal costs is changed because more of the unchanged aggregate output is produced by the rms whose marginal costs have been lowered. Since the rearrangement of marginal costs a ects neither industry revenue nor consumer surplus while it strictly reduces aggregate production costs, industry pro t and social surplus must strictly increase.
We n o w examine the implications of this result for two-stage games.
III A Su cient Condition for Asymmetric Actions by Identical
Agents to be Optimal
In many m ulti-stage games in the literature, ex ante identical rms take actions at a prior stage which determine the set of constant marginal costs used to play a Cournot game in the nal stage.
Such games arise, for example, in the study of learning-by-doing, extraction with depletion e ects, pollution control, cost-reducing R&D, and research joint v entures. Since the rms are typically assumed to be ex ante identical, identical prior actions by them give rise to identical marginal costs in the nal stage. Such rst-stage choices, however, may not be in the rms' joint i n terest if they act collectively. Moreover, if the rms act independently and their rst-stage equilibrium choices would otherwise be identical, a social planner intervening only in the rst stage may w ant to induce nonidentical actions to maximize social surplus.
Because of the Corollary there is a presumption in the context of two-stage games that nonidentical actions by identical agents in the rst stage will increase social surplus and industry pro t|unless the additional cost of the departure from identical actions in the rst stage outweighs the net bene t induced in the second stage. In some applications, it turns out that no additional costs arise if the prior actions of the identical agents are made to di er in ways which preserve the sum of marginal costs in the second stage. In such cases, it is always both socially and privately optimal for the prior actions of the identical agents to be asymmetric. In other applications, asymmetric behavior will be optimal as long as the additional costs of introducing asymmetry at a prior stage are su ciently small. In the rest of this section, we i n troduce a two-stage framework that encompasses many of the diverse speci cations commonly found in the literature. We then derive a condition su cient for asymmetric treatment of identical agents to be optimal.
Consider a two-stage game in which each o f n rms chooses an action in the rst stage that lowers its second-stage constant marginal cost of production. For simplicity, w e do not discount secondstage payo s. Assume that each rm produces a homogeneous good and competes as a Cournot player in the second stage, given a marginal cost determined by rst-stage actions. Assume the rms are ex ante identical in all respects. That is, the cost of a given action is the same regardless of the identity of the rm undertaking it; if a given set of actions results in a given set of marginal costs in the second stage, rearranging the identities of the rms taking the actions would simply rearrange the identities of the rms with the corresponding marginal costs.
Let x = x 1 ; : : : x n denote the list of prior actions of the n rms. Such actions can be interpreted variously as rst-stage production, R&D investment, pollution control, and so on. However, since actions which i n v olve costs in the rst stage generate bene ts in the second stage, it is convenient to refer to rst-stage actions as investments." Denote the cost to rm i of investment x as f i x: Denote industry investment costs as Fx = P n i =1 f i x. Assume that f i x is 1 weakly increasing in each argument, 2 weakly convex and, for simplicity, 3 twice continuously di erentiable. Since F is the sum of these individual investment-cost functions, it inherits these three properties.
Denote the constant marginal cost of production at rm i in the second stage as c i x. Assume investments lower marginal costs|that is, assume an increase in rm i's investment raises no rm's marginal cost and strictly lowers at least one rm's marginal cost. 7 Assume, however, that more 7 It is common in the literatures on cost-reduction, learning-by-doing, and research joint v entures, for a prior action intensive i n v estments exhibit diminishing returns and, as a result, c i x i s w eakly convex. For simplicity, assume c i x i s t wice continuously di erentiable. Denote the sum of the marginal costs of production in the last stage as hx = P n i =1 c i x. Let x i = x for i = 1 ; : : : ; nbe an investment combination in which all rms invest the same amount x and denote the n-tuple of such i n v estments as x : De ne c as the sum of the second-stage marginal costs of production, evaluated at x : c = hx : Now x the investments of n , 2 of the rms at x but allow the investments of the remaining two rms labeled, without loss of generality, rm 1 and rm 2 to vary. W e denote the resulting n-tuple of investments as x 1 ; x 2 ; x ; : : : ; x :De ne as the set of investment combinations that result in a marginal-cost sum of c in the second stage: = fx 1 ; x 2 j h x 1 ; x 2 ; x ; : : : ; x = c g . W e refer to the locus of combinations x 1 ; x 2 that generate marginal-cost sum c as the iso-sum" locus and denote it as x 2 = gx 1 . Since an increase in rm 1's investment strictly lowers the marginal cost sum @h=@x 1 0, a decrease in the investment of rm 2 is required to maintain a constant sum of marginal costs at the n rms. Therefore g 0 x 1 0.
Consider now the sign of g 00 . Since each rm's marginal-cost function is convex in x, the sum of these convex functions hx will also be convex. It follows that the set of points with marginal cost sums smaller than c |the lower contour set fxjhx c g|is a convex set. This means that if the iso-sum locus were plotted with x 1 on the horizontal axis and x 2 on the vertical axis, it would be downward-sloping and convex like an ordinary indi erence curve except that its lower contour set would lie to the northeast of the locus. Therefore, g 00 0. 8 Indeed, if the exogenous c i x functions are strictly convex, the lower contour sets of hx will be strictly convex, implying g 00 0.
If x globally maximizes the objective function be it industry pro t or social surplus, it must not only be the best equal investment combination|but it must also be weakly superior to any other point in the domain|including all unequal investment combinations on the same iso-sum locus.
However, our comparative-static result creates the presumption that the objective function be it industry pro t or social surplus will be maximized at an asymmetric point. We s a y presumption"
by one rm to lower not merely that rm's second-stage marginal cost of production but also, because of reverse engineering or spillovers, the marginal cost of its rivals. Our formulation allows for such cases.
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The second derivative o f g exists given our assumption that c i x i s t wice continuously di erentiable.
because the cost of inducing asymmetry at the rst stage may in principle outweigh the gain in the second stage which results from the asymmetry. W e n o w derive a condition su cient for asymmetric actions to be privately and or socially optimal.
When are Asymmetric Actions by Identical Firms Optimal?
When rm 1 invests x 1 and rm 2 invests exactly enough gx 1 so that when the remaining n ,2 rms invest x the marginal-cost sum remains c , industry pro t can be written as a function of a single variable:
where Ix 1 is the aggregate cost of investment in the rst stage, Rx 1 is industry revenue in the second stage, and Cx 1 is the aggregate cost of production then. Similarly, when rm 1 invests x 1 ; rm 2 invests gx 1 and the remaining rms invest x , social surplus can be written as:
Wx 1 = S x 1 , I x 1 , C x 1 ; 5 where Sx 1 is gross consumer surplus. To determine how industry pro t and social surplus vary with x 1 along the iso-sum locus, we examine how each term in the two sums vary with x 1 .
By de nition, the sum of the marginal costs of production remains unchanged at points along the iso-sum locus. As a consequence, the sum of the outputs associated with these points is also constant as long as all rms produce. Accordingly, neither industry revenue nor gross consumer surplus, the rst terms in equations 4 and 5 respectively, will vary along the iso-sum locus.
Industry pro t and social surplus will therefore increase whenever the decline in production costs in the last stage exceeds the rise in investment costs in the rst stage.
We n o w v erify that the aggregate cost of investment along the iso-sum locus is minimized at the equal investment point. The aggregate cost of investment along the iso-sum locus is Ix 1 = F x 1 ; g x 1 ; x ; : : : ; x :
6 Di erentiating and letting subscripts denote partial derivatives, we obtain:
I 0 x 1 = F 1 + F 2 g 0 x 1 : 7 At the equal investment point, symmetry requires that F 1 x = F 2 x and also, as shown formally in Appendix A, that g 0 x = , 1. Hence, I 0 x = 0 : Di erentiating Ix 1 t wice with respect to x 1 and evaluating the result at x 1 = x yields I 00 x = 2 F 11 x , F 12 x + F 2 x g 00 x 0: 8
The weak inequality arises because Fx and gx 1 are weakly convex and F i s w eakly increasing. 9 If Fx is strictly convex or, alternatively, strictly increasing with g strictly convex, then I 00 x 0 and the aggregate investment cost of the n rms is strictly smaller at the equal investment point than at other points on the iso-sum locus.
We h a v e shown that movements away from the equal investment point along the iso-sum locus leave industry revenue and gross consumer surplus unchanged but increase the aggregate investment cost of the n rms. If such a m o v ement nonetheless increases industry pro t and or social surplus, it must induce a more than o setting reduction in aggregate production costs:
c i x 1 ; g x 1 ; x ; : : : ; x q i x 1 ; g x 1 ; x ; : : : ; x : 9
In fact, this is a distinct possibility since, as argued in section II, production costs are larger at the equal investment point than at any other investment combination on the iso-sum locus which induces distinct marginal costs but an interior equilibrium.
Di erentiating equations 4 and 5 and recalling that movements along the iso-sum locus in the neighborhood of the equal investment point h a v e no e ect on industry revenue and gross consumer surplus, we obtain 0 x = W 0 x = , I 0 x , C 0 x :
10
We showed above that the rst term on the right-hand side is zero. As for the second term, it is also zero since di erentiability has been assumed and we showed in section II that aggregate production costs are larger at the equal investment point than at other points on the iso-sum locus resulting in an interior equilibrium. 10 9
Since the second derivatives of F are assumed to exist and the function is weakly convex, F11x 0; F 22x 0, and F11xF22x F12xF21x. Given symmetry, this implies that F11x F12x and thus, in condition 8, I 00 x F2x g 00 x 0.
For an alternative demonstration that C 0 x = 0, see Appendix A.
Di erentiating again, we obtain: 00 x = W 00 x = , I 00 x , C 00 x :
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The pro t and social surplus functions each a c hieve a local minimum at the equal investment point if the concavity of the aggregate cost of production outweighs the convexity of the aggregate cost of investment|that is, if 00 = W 00 x = , I 00 x , C 00 x 0: In condition 6 of Appendix A, we show that I 00 x = 2 F 11 x , F 12 x , F 2 x P n i=1 c i 11 x , c i 12 x P n i=1 c i 2 x ! 0:
12 In condition 9 of Appendix A, we show that C 00 x = 4c 1 1 x , c 2 1 x 2 P 0
0: 13
Thus, the objective function is smaller at the equal investment point x 1 = x 2 = x than at any other point on the iso-sum locus inducing an interior equilibrium if the following inequality holds:
, 2 F 11 , F 12 , F 2 P n i=1 c i 11 , c i 12 P n i=1 c i 2 ! , 4c 1 1 , c 2 1 2 P 0
0: 14
The rst term is weakly negative but may be more than o set by the second term, which i s strictly positive. This inevitably occurs in the extreme case where F = 0. As the next section makes clear, it can also occur when F 0|for instance when each rm's marginal-cost function is linear in x c i ij = c j ij = 0 a n d F 11 , F 12 is either zero or at least small. Whenever the second term in condition 14 predominates, unequal investments in the neighborhood of x will cause the increased pro ts in the second stage to more than cover the increased cost in the rst stage.
Recall that x represents any investment combination in which all rms invest equally and that the su cient condition in 14 is evaluated at this point. Now let x = x ; : : : ; x 2R N ++ be the equal investment combination which maximizes industry pro t. Then condition 14 when evaluated at x becomes a su cient condition for unequal investments to maximize industry pro t. Similarly, let x W = x W ; : : : ; x W 2R N ++ be the equal investment combination which maximizes social surplus. Then condition 14 when evaluated at x W becomes a su cient condition for unequal investments to maximize social surplus. In general, since x 6 = x W , the su cient condition may hold at one point but not the other. In such cases, it is possible that one optimum requires asymmetric investments while the other may i n v olve symmetric investments.
IV Applications
We h a v e deduced a condition su cient for ex ante identical rms to increase their joint pro t by taking asymmetric actions in the rst stage. The same condition, evaluated at a di erent point, su ces for asymmetric actions to be optimal from a social planner's perspective. In this section, we apply our analysis to several prominent literatures|the literature on learning-by-doing, on pollution control, and on R&D joint v entures.
We begin with the learning-by-doing model of Fudenberg and Tirole 1983. They consider a t w o-stage game in which n Cournot competitors produce a homogeneous good in each o f t w o periods. Each rm has the same constant marginal cost in the rst period, which w e denote c, and a marginal cost in the second period that is decreasing in rst-period production because of learning-by-doing. In an accompanying example, they assume rm i's second-period marginal cost is given by c i x = c , x i , subject to parameter restrictions that insure c i x 0. The inverse demand in each period is given by PQ = 1 , Q .
T o translate their example to our framework, note that the aggregate private cost of the prior actions of the n rms is the monopoly pro t foregone because of deviations from the monopoly output vector. Let M be the myopic rst-period monopoly pro t the pro t a cartel would earn if there were no dependence between periods and let X M be the monopoly output. The cost of taking actions x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x n can then be interpreted as the amount b y which actual industry pro t in the rst period falls short of the monopoly pro t. Thus, Fx = M , P X , c X; 8X 0 where X = P n i=1 x i is rst-period aggregate production. It is straightforward to verify that Fx is convex because pro t is concave. 11 Notice that F 11 0 and F 12 0 but because industry 11 Our assumption that rm i's marginal revenue is everywhere weakly decreasing in its rivals' output implies that the pro t function is concave. However, as discussed in section II, such perturbations always lower production costs. Indeed, using condition 13 from section III, C 00 = ,4 2 0. Hence, condition 14 indicates that equal prior actions are always suboptimal: 00 x = W 00 x W = 4 2 0. Since there is no cost of introducing asymmetry in the rst period and since second-period gains are strictly positive, maximization of industry pro ts requires that rms choose asymmetric actions. If, on the other hand, the rms behave noncooperatively at the rst stage and the government can intervene only at that stage, say, through subsidies designed to accelerate the learning process, then social optimality requires unequal treatment unequal subsidies of the identical rms. 12
The optimality of asymmetric treatment for any admissible parameters does not depend on linear demand. It does, however, require given F 11 , F 12 = 0 that marginal costs be linear in rst-period actions. If second-period marginal costs were instead strictly convex in x, then introducing asymmetry while keeping the marginal-cost sum constant w ould require an increase in aggregate output in the rst stage and would result in foregone pro t, assuming X X M , in the rst stage. In that case, the additional cost in the rst stage would have t o b e w eighed against the reduction in production costs achieved in the second stage.
To explore this variation in more detail, consider Newbery's 1990 analysis of pollution control.
In his study of acid rain, each rm's second-stage marginal cost is a strictly convex function of the rst-stage decision while the aggregate cost of the rst-stage decisions once again depends on their sum. In Newbery's model, the government dictates the maximum pollution it will permit from each rm. A rm's pollution increases in its own output and decreases in its own level of abatement.
Two rms play a Cournot game and have abatement costs but no production costs. Whatever production decision a rm makes in the second stage must be matched by a decision to purchase abatement equipment to bring its pollution within the government's standard. Since equipment i s costly, no rm pollutes less than it is permitted.
Let x i denote the maximal pollution permitted rm i, h i denote the amount of abatement equipment purchased by rm i, and r be the exogenous per-unit cost of this equipment. Let the amount of pollution released by rm i be increasing in its output and decreasing in its abatement e ort|speci cally, x i = q i =h i : Then if rm i produces q i in the second stage it must have abatement equipment h i = q i =x i which will cost rq i =x i : Hence, it is as if the rm has a constant marginal cost of production of c i x = r=x i . Newbery assumes that the inverse demand curve in the second stage is linear: PQ = a , Q: Hence, rm i's overall pro t is: PQ , r=x i q i : Suppose social damage depends on the aggregate pollution of the two rms: Fx = x 1 + x 2 2 = : If the government w ere to assign pollution levels to the two rms in the rst stage knowing that they would compete as Cournot duopolists in the second stage, condition 14 indicates that whenever r 2x W 2 p , social optimality requires that the government set di erent pollution standards for the two rms even though they are ex ante identical. 13 In both Fudenberg and Tirole 1983 and Newbery 1990 , each rm's cost of investment depends not only on its own action but on the actions of others. At the aggregate level, although F 11 0 and F 12 0; F nonetheless depends only on the sum of the rst-stage actions. This considerably simpli es the expression for I 00 in condition 12 because it implies that F 11 , F 12 = 0 : In Kamien, 13 In this example, I 00 = 1 6 = and C 00 = ,4r 2 =x W 4 . I f = r = 1, it can be shown that unequal pollution standards are socially optimal for all 1 a 40.
Muller and Zang 1992, on the other hand, the cost of investment t o r m i does not depend on the action of any other rm. Yet because they assume R&D spending is measured by its dollar cost, i.e., Fx = P n i =1 x i and so F 1 = F 2 = 1 and F 11 = F 22 = F 12 = F 21 = 0 ; the same simpli cation to condition 12 arises as in the two models reviewed previously. In one case on which they focus attention, identical rms are permitted to coordinate their research i n v estments to maximize joint pro ts prior to competing as Cournot rivals in the product market. The rms face an inverse demand of demand of P = a , Q and rm i incurs a marginal cost of production given by c i x = A , X i , where X i = x i + x j is rm i's e ective R&D investment. Since the function X i is assumed twice di erentiable, strictly increasing and concave, c i x is strictly convex as in the Newbery model. Substituting these functional forms into condition 12 gives I 00 x = , 2 00 1, 2 0 1+ 0. Moreover, substitutions into condition 13 imply that C 00 x = , 41 , Substituting these functional forms into condition 12 we conclude I 00 x = 2 0 : Moreover, substitutions into condition 13 imply that C 00 x = , 4 , 1 2 =b 0: Hence, condition 14
indicates that equal investments are suboptimal for the research cartel 15 whenever 2 ,1 2 =b. Since this inequality depends only on exogenous parameters, and not on a particular level of x 1 , the same condition holds whether the objective function is industry pro t or social surplus. Hence, if asymmetric investments are optimal for a social planner constrained to intervene only in the rst stage, a research cartel maximizing joint pro ts will also choose asymmetric investments and conversely. When this happens, the formation of the research joint v enture will necessarily lead to increased concentration greater dispersion as measured, for example, by the Her ndahl index despite the absence of collusion in the product market.
V Conclusion
In this paper, we h a v e examined a phenomenon which arises when prior actions reduce nal-stage marginal costs of production. Given Cournot behavior in the nal stage it is sometimes both socially and privately optimal if coordination is possible to invest asymmetrically at the prior stage.
It would be a mistake to dismiss this phenomenon as a mere artifact of the assumption of constant marginal costs of production. For, our conclusions persist when this assumption is relaxed.
Suppose each rm's marginal cost is instead an increasing linear function of its output with a rmspeci c intercept which can be reduced by prior investment and a xed common slope a i +mq i . It is easily shown that: 1 aggregate output, price, industry revenue, and gross consumer surplus are the same in every interior equilibrium where the sum of the rm-speci c intercepts is unchanged; 2 industry pro t and social welfare strictly increase whenever the variance of the rm-speci c intercepts increases; and consequently 3 there is a presumption that a cartel coordinating actions in the rst stage or a social planner able to intervene directly only in the rst stage would each prefer asymmetric investments. Not only are these conclusions unchanged but they can be reached by a trivial extension of our previous arguments. 16 : 5 ; it is possible to satisfy this restriction but nonetheless also satisfy 2 , 1 2 =b, the condition in the text requiring pro t-maximizing investments to be unequal.
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The rst-order condition for rm i is PQ + q i P 0 Q = a i + mqi: Summing, we obtain nPQ + Q P 0 , m = P n i =1 ai which implies that the aggregate output depends only on the sum of the rm-speci c intercepts. The rst-order condition can be solved to obtain qi = P,a i m,P 0 . Substitute this into the following expression for industry cost: P n i=1 aiqi + m P n i=1 q 2 i =2: This yields an expression which depends only on P n i=1 ai and P n i=1 a 2 i : Since it is strictly decreasing in the latter, industry costs strictly decrease if P n i=1 ai is unchanged but the sum of squares of the rm-speci c intercepts strictly increases. Hence our Proposition and Corollary generalize: among all marginal costs curves with the same intercept sum, the set with equal intercepts minimizes social surplus and pro t.
Our asymmetry result is at rst surprising because, as a profession, we h a v e become accustomed to thinking about the problem where coordination occurs at neither stage. In such fully decentralized problems, symmetric investments at the rst stage typically occur in equilibrium.
But if the point of departure were instead the fully centralized problem, where a single decisionmaker|whether a cartel or social planner|controlled production in the second stage as well as investments in the rst, asymmetric investments would be the norm. This is simplest to see when the marginal cost of production is constant. Given constant-returns-to-scale in production, it is always cheapest|regardless of parameter values|to produce a given aggregate output at a single rm. Expending any resources to reduce the marginal cost of a second rm is never sensible; it is not only costly but pointless since the rst rm can produce unlimited quantities without inducing the slightest increase in marginal cost. The ultimate source of the asymmetry result in these problems is the nonconvex curvature posited for the production-cost function. 17 With the technology posited, a central planner or cartel who could control not merely rst-stage investments but also second-stage production would reduce marginal cost at only one rm even though all rms are indistinguishable ex ante.
But even if each marginal cost of production is instead an upward-sloping linear function of a rm's second-stage output, asymmetric investments are often optimal. Indeed, they are always optimal in the case where the marginal cost of increased investment in the rst stage is constant and investment linearly a ects marginal costs in the nal stage. Suppose for simplicity that the planner controlled two rms. Provisionally require him to invest equally in each of them. At the constrained optimum, he would choose the best common investment level and then would choose to produce equally at the two rms. Now relax the provisional constraint. Then by increasing investment in one rm and reducing investment in the other by an equal amount, while keeping production unchanged at each, the planner would a ect neither production costs nor investment costs. However, this would result in di erent marginal costs at the two rms and hence an opportunity to strictly lower costs by rearranging production. It follows that asymmetric investments are always optimal in this case. If the marginal cost of additional investment a t e a c h rm is instead strictly increasing, then 17 Each rm's production cost is R q 0 a , x , bsds = aq , xq + bq 2 =2; which is not jointly convex in q;x. asymmetric investments are still sometimes optimal in the fully centralized problem. 18 Once it is appreciated that asymmetric investments are sometimes optimal when production decisions are fully centralized, it should not be surprising that this phenomenon carries over to the situation where outputs are chosen noncooperatively in the nal stage. But after the surprise wears o and one realizes both the pervasiveness of the phenomenon and the di culty o f a v oiding it, one wants a fuller understanding|which w e h a v e sought to provide.
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For the case in which the investment-cost functions are strictly convex f 00 0, the optimality of asymmetric investments will depend on parameters. To see this for the simplest case, suppose investment at the rst stage reduces linearly the intercept at the second stage. Denote the optimal common investment a s x and the optimal associated production at each rm as q. Then each rm's production cost is R q 0 a , x , bsds = aq , xq + bq 2 =2: Now consider perturbing the two rms' investments in equal but opposite directions by some amount . Suppose aggregate output is xed at Q = 2 q in the second-stage, but allow the xed output to be produced in the cheapest way b y equating production marginal costs between rms. Let q denote the optimal production at the rm which receives the additional investment. That is, q is the solution to the following equation: a,x, +mq = a , x + + m Q , q and hence q 0 = 1 =m: Aggregate investment plus production costs can be written as Di erentiating and evaluating at = 0 , w e obtain: C 0 0 = 0 and C 00 0 = 2 f 00 , 2=d. Hence, if mf 00 1 then C 00 0 0 and asymmetric investments are optimal. We discussed in turn the case where m = 0 and f 00 0 and then the case where f 00 = 0 but m 0. Clearly the su cient condition for asymmetry mf 00 1 is always satis ed in these polar cases; but it can sometimes be satis ed when f 00 0 and m 0.
Appendix A In this appendix we compute the rst and second derivatives of the aggregate investment and cost functions as investment in rm 1 is increased along the iso-sum locus in the neighborhood of the equal investment point. The analysis proceeds in three steps.
Step 1: To begin, we calculate the rst and second derivatives of gx 1 and then evaluate them at x . Since the iso-sum locus x 2 = gx 1 satis es P n i=1 c i x 1 ; x 2 ; x ; : : : ; x = c , w e apply the implicit function theorem to obtain g 0 x 1 = , P n i =1 c i 1 x 1 ; x 2 ; x ; : : : ; x P n i =1 c i 2 x 1 ; x 2 ; x ; : : : ; x :
A.1
Evaluating A.1 at x 1 = x 2 = x yields g 0 x = , 1, since c 1 1 = c 2 2 , c 2 1 = c 1 2 and c k 1 = c k 2 , k = 3 ; : : : ; n , for any equal investment combination. Di erentiating gx 1 t wice with respect to x 1 gives g 00 x 1 = , P n j =1 c j 2 P n i=1 , c i 11 + c i 12 g 0 + P n j=1 c j 1 P n i=1 , c i 21 + c i 22 g 0 P n j=1 c j 2 2 Step 2: Di erentiating Ix 1 |equation 6 in the text|twice with respect to x 1 yields I 00 x 1 = F 11 + F 12 g 0 + F 21 g 0 + F 22 g 0 2 + F 2 g 00 :
A.5
Substituting g 0 x = , 1 i n to A.5 and using condition A.4 gives the desired result:
I 00 x = 2 F 11 , F 12 , F 2 P n i=1 c i 11 , c i 12 P n i=1 c i 2 ! 0:
This second derivative is reported as equation 12 in the text.
Step 3: Next we show that aggregate production costs are maximized at x . Di erentiating Cx 1 |equation 9 in the text|with respect to x 1 and noting that the sum of outputs and sum of marginal costs are xed along the iso-sum locus gives A.8
Substituting g 0 x = , 1 i n to A.8 and using condition B.3 from Appendix B gives C 00 x = 4c 1 1 , c 2 1 2 P 0 0: A.9
This justi es condition 13 in the text.
Appendix B
In this appendix we derive the result used in condition A.9 of Appendix A. Let i denote rm i's second-period pro t as a function of the second-period output pro le given marginal costs determined by the rst-period action pro le. Assuming an interior optimum, q i is uniquely determined by the n rst order conditions: PQ + P 0 Q q i , c i x = 0 ; i = 1 ; : : : ; n :
T otally di erentiating these conditions with respect to x i and then imposing symmetry yields a two-by-two system of equations which can be expressed in matrix form as 
